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Abstract 
We argue that econometric analyses based on transition countries’ data can be 
vulnerable to structural breaks across time and/or countries. We demonstrate this 
argument by identifying structural breaks in growth regressions estimated with 
data for 25 countries and 12 years. Our method allows identification of structural 
breaks at a-priori unknown points in space or time. The only prior assumption is 
that breaks occur in relation to progress in implementing market-oriented reforms. 
We find robust evidence that the pattern of growth in transition has changed at 
least two times, yielding thus three different models of growth associated with 
different stages of reform. The speed with which individual countries progress 
through these stages differs dramatically, however.  
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1  Introduction 
Transition is a process of structural change. Market-oriented reform, if implemented effectively, 
results in rapid and dramatic changes in the regulatory and institutional environment, transfer of 
ownership from the state to private agents and free setting of prices in commodity and labor 
markets. State dirigisme is replaced by market economy and individual agents make their 
decisions pursuing their own best interests. Change is thus the quintessential characteristic, and 
indeed the objective, of the transition process in the post-communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe. The multifaceted process of change that is so central to transition, however, 
implies that many fundamental relationships determining how post-communist economies work 
will in fact change as well. Few students of transition would doubt this simple and 
uncontroversial observation. Yet, most empirical studies of transition do not account for the 
changing nature of the relationships they analyze.  
Failure to account for structural breaks during transition can have serious consequences as the 
analysis then utilizes data generated by two (or more) different statistical models. The resulting 
estimates then reflect only the average of pre- and post-break relationships rather than the two (or 
multiple) true patterns and are therefore misleading. Adding new observations may change the 
resulting estimates considerably if the balance between pre- and post-break data is altered. As a 
consequence, studies addressing the same topic using the same but updated or extended data may 
find different or even widely diverging results. A good example is the discussion of the impact of 
market-oriented reform policies on growth, which, following the initial contribution of De Melo, 
Denizer and Gelb (1996), generated a number of different findings ranging from a strong positive 
relationship to an insignificant one.  
We use the relationship between reform policies and growth to demonstrate the fragility of 
analytical results obtained with data spanning a large number of years and/or countries. There is 
already a sizeable literature on this issue of potentially great importance – whether progress in 
implementing market-oriented reform delivers higher growth. The discussion was spurred by the 
finding of De Melo et al. (1996) of a strong positive relationship in a cross section of 26 
countries, with data covering the early 1990s. The defining characteristic of the ensuing debate 
was a general lack of consensus (see, for example, De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996; 
Havrylyshyn, Izvorski and van Rooden, 1998; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; Heybey and Murrell, 
1999; Berg et al., 1999; Wolf, 1999; Fischer and Sahay, 2000; Popov, 2000; and the survey by 2 
Campos and Coricelli, 2002). While several studies replicated the finding of a positive impact of 
reform policies on growth, others countered with findings of a weak or insignificant relationship.  
Most previous analyses do not consider the possibility of structural breaks and simply pool all 
available countries and years. Yet, economic growth is one of the processes where one should 
anticipate dramatic changes in the course of transition. First, progress in market-oriented reform 
should improve the allocation of resources and increase the efficiency of their use, thus delivering 
higher growth. Second, a reform effort of a given magnitude may have dramatically different 
repercussion if implemented in the context of a centrally planned economy and in a partial or 
nearly full-fledged market environment. Some studies do split the data arbitrarily into groups of 
countries or sub-periods. Selowsky and Martin (1997) and Tichit (1999) analyze separately the 
Central and Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union and find substantial 
differences between the two sub-groups. Fidrmuc (2003) estimates his regressions for different 
periods and, also, finds substantial differences. Yet, the various post-communist countries 
implemented market-oriented reforms at different pace and with varying resolve, while some 
even experienced temporary or sustained reform reversals. At any point in time, therefore, some 
countries will be closer to becoming market economies than others and may therefore belong to 
different models of growth. Then, while arbitrarily partitioning of the data may improve on 
regressions estimated with pooled data, one is little likely to partition the data exactly at the true 
location of structural breaks.  
We employ an analytical method that allows us to determine the presence of (potentially 
multiple) structural breaks in the data at ex-ante location. We do so by testing for structural 
breaks in both time and space, specifically allowing for individual countries to follow different 
models of growth at any given point in time. In this manner, structural breaks are identified based 
on statistical inference about differences in patterns of growth rather than our prior beliefs about 
which countries or which years should be lumped together. The only prior belief that we impose 
on the analytical algorithm is an assumption that structural breaks occur in relation to progress in 
implementing market-oriented reforms. We believe this assumption to be reasonable: given that 
the very objective of transition is transforming centrally-planned economies into market-based 
ones, one may expect those proceeding more rapidly to experience structural change earlier than 
those dragging their feet on reform.  
A side product of our analysis is that we construct a new measure of progress in 
implementing market-oriented reforms (which is central to our analysis). Previous studies 3 
typically used a simple average of the eight progress-in-transition indicators reported annually by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). However, applying equal 
weight to these eight indexes is not necessarily justified. Therefore, we construct a weighted 
reform index with weights determined by factor analysis.  
Our findings confirm considerable variation in transition experiences across the different 
countries. In our baseline model, we find evidence of two structural breaks. Correspondingly, we 
identify three stable models of growth. As we expected, individual countries make their way 
through the three models of growth with different speed: while some find themselves in the most 
advanced stage of growth already by mid 1990s, others remain in the second or even first stage 
throughout the decade.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the following section, we introduce the data 
used in our analysis and discuss construction of the weighted reform index. Section 3 presents the 
results and Section 4 summarizes our conclusions.  
 
2  Data 
The socialist countries shared a number of important factors that should have predestined them to 
grow at respectable rates: high investment rates, educated and skilled labor and relatively low 
income levels
1. Yet, as has been recognized by a number of analysts (see in particular Ofer, 1987; 
and Easterly and Fischer, 1995), they failed to use the available resources efficiently and 
therefore, after the potential for extensive growth was exhausted, economic development came to 
a halt during the 1980s. The subsequent reforms, however, fell short of delivering universally 
shared improvement and instead lead to a great variety of outcomes. While some countries 
resumed growth after a few years of a transformational recession, others experienced severe and 
protracted declines with little subsequent recovery. To demonstrate this variation in outcomes, 
Figure 1 reports cumulative growth between 1989 and 2001 for the 25 post-communist countries 
for which data are available. On the one hand, Slovenia and Poland have seen their GDP rise by 
17 and 27 percent, with further five countries also reporting positive cumulative growth. On the 
other hand, most transition economies report negative cumulative growth and some of the former 
Soviet Republics even found themselves in 2001 at output levels less than half those attained 
                                                 
1 A common finding in the growth literature is the so-called conditional convergence, i.e. poor countries tend to 
grow faster, after controlling for other determinants of growth (see Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; and 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992).  4 
before the transition began. In general, the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
returned to positive growth 2 or 3 years after the beginning of transition whereas the former 
Soviet Union (FSU) countries experienced prolonged periods of economic decline (4-5 years or 
even longer). 
 
Figure 1 Cumulative Growth, 1989-2001 
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As the aim of the paper is to test whether the post-communist transition countries follow 
different models of growth depending on their degree of progress towards a market economy, the 
first problem to settle is to find an accurate measure of this progress. The EBRD offers diverse 
quantitative indicators to take into account the many facets of the transformation. Each year it 
provides figures for 8 variables taking the values 0 to 1, to measure the progress in each of the 
following fields: Price liberalization, Foreign exchange and Trade Liberalization, Small Scale 
Privatization, Large Scale Privatization, Enterprise Reform, Competition Policy, Banking Reform 
and Non-banking Financial Institutions. If these different indicators measure the same 
phenomenon – the progress towards the market economy – they must be closely related. Table 1, 
listing the coefficients of correlation between the country averages of the eight EBRD indexes, 5 
clearly shows that there is a high degree of dependency between them. In particular, the following 
pairs of sub-indexes show very high correlation: enterprise and banking reforms (90.8%), the 
foreign exchange\trade liberalization with banking reform (80.4%) and with price liberalization 
(80%). In general, competition policy is less correlated with the other variables. Those results 
reflect between-countries correlations, as they are calculated with average values for the period 
1990-2001. While carrying out the same exercise year by year, some variation appears (see 
annex), but the main conclusions do not change.  
 
Table 1: Percentage of common variation between EBRD indicators 
 Price  Lib 
Forex/Trade 
Lib 
Small 
Scale 
Priv 
Large 
Scale 
Priv 
Ent. 
Reform
Comp. 
Policy 
Bank 
Reform 
Non-
bank. 
Fin. Inst. 
Price Liberalization  100               
Forex/Trade Liberalization  80.0  100            
Small Scale Privatization  64.5  71.0 100          
Large Scale Privatization  38.4  58.0 52.7 100        
Enterprise Reform  53.3  64.5 59.4 72.5 100      
Competition Policy  16.3  22.7 22.1 45.9 59.2 100     
Banking Reform  71.7  80.4 66.7 70.6 90.8 41.4  100  
Non-bank. Financial Inst.  30.1  35.7 36.0 49.0 69.8 68.3  61.5 100
Note: Correlations calculated on average values of EBRD indicators for 1990-2001. 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2003.   
 
 
Because of the high correlation between the various sub-indexes, previous studies typically 
used their simple average so that the eight measures were reduced to one. However, to the best of 
our knowledge, none of these studies tested whether assigning equal weight is in fact appropriate. 
Therefore, as the first step in our analysis, we perform a factor analysis to determine if all the 
eight EBRD indicators measure the same phenomenon – the evolution towards market economy – 
or if they reflect independent information contained in some of the sub-indexes. Moreover, while 
computing a general aggregated index, this method ensures finding the appropriate weight for 
each of the sub-indexes in a composite weighted-average reform index.  
In application, there are not one but several factor analysis models which differ in significant 
respects. A model most often applied is called common factor analysis (or principal component 
analysis). Common factor analysis is concerned with defining the patterns of common variation 
among a set of variables. Variation unique to a variable is ignored. In contrast, another factor 
model called component factor analysis is concerned with patterning all the variation in a set of 6 
variables, whether common or unique. We use the second method, as it allows to determine the 
degree of unique variation for each indicator.  
What we try to do is to find a good indicator of the degree of progress towards becoming full-
fledged market economies. This variable is unobserved. What we have is a set of indexes that are 
trying to measure the progress in different policies aimed at transforming the economy. The 
component factor analysis pursues this objective by estimating the following equation system: 
Y1 =  11F1 +  12F2 + . . . +  1mFm+ ε1,  
Y2 =  21F1 +  22F2 + . . . +  2mFm+ ε2,  
Y3 =  31F1 +  32F2 + . . . +  3mFm+ ε3,  
. . .  
. . .  
. . .  
Yn =  n1F1 +  n2F2 + . . . +  nmFm+ εn,  
 
where Y is a variable with known data (in our case, the eight EBRD indicators),   are the 
loadings (constant), F is a function, f ( ) of some unknown variables and ε the variation of Y that 
is independent of the factors. 
It is crucial in understanding factor analysis to remember that F stands for a function of 
variables and not a variable. By application to the known data on the Y variables, factor analysis 
defines the unknown F functions. The factors are the F functions. The size of each loading for 
each factor measures how much that specific function is related to Y. We may find that some of 
the F functions are common to several variables. These are called group factors. To decide how 
many factors to retain, we use the common criteria of an eigenvalue higher than 0.5. The 
eigenvalue of the first factor is 6.12 while that for the second one is 0.39. Therefore, we only 
retain the first factor. The results of the estimation are reported in Table 2. 
The first column shows the factor loadings which are the coefficients of correlation between 
each EBRD indicator and the factor. We can see that all indicators are strongly positively related 
to the factor. This reveals that the factor clearly represents the progress towards creating a market 
economy. The second column gives the communality for each variable. It corresponds to the 
percentage of variation of the indicator that it is linked to the factor.
2 The communalities are very 
high for each variable, reaching on average 76.5% of total variance. Finally, the last column 
shows the uniqueness of each variable, which depicts the percentage of total variation that is 
autonomous. Of course, the sum of the last two columns for each row must be equal to 100. The 
                                                 
2 The communality for each variable is the square of the loading multiplied by 100. 7 
results indicate that the most independent indicator is price liberalization. Nevertheless, all the 
percentages of uniqueness are far less than 50%, implying that all the variables are highly 
correlated among themselves. Computing a common factor analysis (which assumes that all the 
communalities are equal to 1) indeed gives almost the same loadings as the component factor 
analysis (unreported results).  
 
Table 2: Factor analysis 
Variable 
 
Factor 1  Communality Uniqueness 
 
Weights 
Price liberalization  0.77  59.7% 40.3%  0.06519 
Foreign exchange/trade lib.  0.90  81.3% 18.7%  0.15068 
Small privatization   0.91  83.0% 17.0%  0.18246 
Large privatization  0.89  78.7% 21.3%  0.09828 
Enterprise reform   0.94  88.4% 11.6%  0.22190 
Competition liberalization  0.81  65.6% 34.4%  0.10091 
Bank liberalization  0.94  87.8% 12.2%  0.18599 
Non bank liberalization  0.82  67.7% 32.3%  0.08338 
Percentage of total variation  -  76.5% 23.5%   
 
 
Using factor analysis, it is possible to endogenously determine the weight for each indicator 
in the aggregate index of the progress towards a market economy (Factor 1). The resulting scores 
are reported in the last column of in Table 2. As one can see, the highest weights are assigned to 
enterprise reform, small scale privatization and banking sector liberalization. These are the three 
most important components of the composite index of the degree of economic liberalization. 
Multiplying the scores and the values of the sub-indexes yields for each year and each country the 
index of progress towards a market economy. The aggregate index takes the values from -1.34 
(most of the countries at the beginning of transition) to +1.93 (Hungary in 2000 and 2001). The 
average level of the index for each country over the period 1989-2001 is reported in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Figure 2 Average level of aggregate index for each country 
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Note: The figure reports country averages over 1989-2001.  
 
 
The former Republics of the USSR progressed more slowly in liberalization of their 
economy: almost all these countries have a negative average index. Only the Baltic Republics 
report positive average values of the indicator. Turkmenistan lags furthermost behind. If we look 
at the evolution of the index over time (see annex 1), it is interesting to note that Croatia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia and to a lesser extend Hungary and Poland began their transition with a 
relatively high degree of liberalization. In 1989 the indicator’s value of the first three countries is 
comparable to those of Belarus and Turkmenistan in 1998. In general, the FSU countries began 
with the lowest level of the indicator and improved it more slowly (except the Baltics). Moreover, 
they are the only countries experiencing reversals in the index’s evolution. For example, Belarus 
improved its index up to -0.17 in 1995 but subsequently the index fell again, reaching -0.78 in 
1999. In 2001 the index is still lower than the 1995 performance (only -0.738). The highest level 
of the indicator among the FSU is Russia in 1997 (0.738) but decreases thereafter. Kyrgyzstan in 
1997 and 1998 takes the second place. Those figures are nonetheless far lower than those of the 
CEECs which in general have a positive value of the indicator after 5 years of transition (ie.1994) 
as opposed to the FSU (including the Baltics) which reach it only after 1997 (8 years of 9 
transformation). Overall thus, the evolution of the countries according to their progress towards a 
market economy is very heterogeneous and does not monotonically depend on time, suggesting 
that the factors governing growth are indeed sensitive to the progress in implementing reforms.  
 
3  Structural Breaks in Growth during Transition 
The conventional approach to finding structural breaks entails applying the Chow test (see Chow, 
1960; and Greene, 1997, chapter 7.6) at a point determined with the help of theory or based on 
observation of stylized facts such as a permanent change in trend. In this analysis, while we 
anticipate that transition will bring about a break in the underlying model of growth (and possibly 
multiple structural breaks), we do not have a clear-cut prior belief that the break should occur at a 
specific point in time or in space. Or, to be precise, we have too many plausible break points such 
as CEE vs FSU (with the Baltic countries alternatively included with the former or the latter), EU 
accession-candidate countries vs the rest, the mid point of transition (alternatively measured in 
calendar or transition time, with the latter counting years since transition began in each particular 
country), etc. Therefore we apply a methodology (following Bai, 1997, and Bai and Perron, 1998) 
that allows us to identify a-priori unknown structural breaks. In essence, our approach involves 
testing for structural breaks across all possible partition of the data into two sub-samples. The 
point of partition that yields the highest (significant) value of the test statistic identifies a 
structural break. Note that several partitions may yield significant values of the test statistic but 
only the partition with the highest value is taken as a true structural break. The algorithm is then 
repeated on the two resulting sub-intervals, until no significant test statistic can be found.  
As our data contain 300 observations (25 countries over 12 years), the number of possible 
partitions is extremely large. Moreover, finding structural breaks based on random partitioning of 
the data would not be very illuminating as it would be difficult to ascertain what factors are 
responsible for the occurrence of the breaks. Therefore, we adopt a simplifying assumption, 
namely that the occurrence of the break is related to the progress in implementing economic 
reforms. Given that we are interested in identifying structural breaks that occur in the course of 
transition from central planning to market economy, this assumption seems justified. 
Accordingly, we order the data by the value of the weighted reform index (described above), and 
perform the partition and compute test statistic for each value of the index.  
 10 
We estimate the following baseline model:  
( ) t j j t j t j j t j t j t j t j POP SECSCH WAR LINFL IC DI RI RI f Y , , , , 1 , , , , , , , ∆ = ∆ −  
where the dependent variable, ∆Yj,t, is the growth rate in country j in year t. The explanatory 
variables include: the reform index (RI), including one lag; a democracy index, DI, which is the 
average value of the indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties reported by the Freedom 
House and rescaled to range between zero (no democracy) and one (full democracy); a composite 
index of initial conditions constructed by the EBRD, ICj, (measuring macroeconomic distortions, 
time spent under communism, distance to the EU, dependence on CMEA for trade and natural 
resource wealth)
3; logarithm of CPI inflation, LINFLj,t; a dummy indicating whether the country 
was involved in a military conflict (internal or external) during the year, WARj,t; secondary school 
enrollment as of late 1980s, SECSCHj; and annual population growth, ∆POPj,t. We tested whether 
fixed or random effects have to be included and found that we can estimate the model as pooled 
cross section. The reform index, initial conditions, inflation and the war dummy are variables that 
have been prominently used in the literature on growth during transition (see, for example, De 
Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996; Aslund, Boone and Johnson, 1996; Havrylyshyn, Izvorski and 
van Rooden, 1998; Berg et al., 1999; Wolf, 1999; Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey, 2002; or Radulescu 
and Barlow, 2002).
4 School enrollment and population growth are included because they are 
among the variables found to be important as determinants of growth in general (see Barro, 1991; 
or Levine and Renelt, 1992). We would have liked to include investment and government 
consumption as these also have been found to have important effects on growth performance but 
that causes too many missing observations, in effect reducing the amount of available data by 
more than a third.  
The results are summarized in Table 3. The first column reports regression results obtained 
with the full sample. This model, however, is found to be unstable in that it contains a structural 
break at a value of the reform index equal to –0.7843 with a test statistic that is highly significant. 
The regression results for the resulting two sub-intervals are reported in columns (2) and (3). The 
algorithm is then repeated on each sub-interval. The first regression model is found to be stable 
(although the test statistic for a structural break at index taking value –0.8862 is close to being 
                                                 
3 This measure is the first factor (out of two) resulting from principal component analysis of a number of initial 
conditions, see Box 2.1 in the EBRD Transition Report 1999, and Falcetti, Raiser and Sanfey (2002). We Follow 
Falcetti et al. (2002) who argue that only the second factor is not robustly related to growth and only use the first one.  
4 The democracy index has not been as frequently used in the literature as the other variables. Therefore, we 
reestimated the model without democracy but the results remain largely the same (and, importantly, the location of 
the structural breaks is the same with or without including the democracy index in the regression).  11 
significant). The second regression model contains another structural break at reform index equal 
to 0.7191. No further structural breaks are found subsequently so that the models reported in 
columns (4) and (5) are stable.  
The analysis thus yields three stable models of growth for the following reform index 
intervals: [-1.3440, -0.7843), [-0.7843, 0.7191) and [0.7191, 1.9326]. For simplicity, we refer to 
these intervals as the pre-reform, early reform and late reform models of growth, respectively.
5 
The first, pre-reform model thus refers to the stage in transition before rigorous reforms are 
implemented. The second and third models then comprise observations with intermediate and 
advanced progress in reform. Note that countries can progress from one model to another at 
different points in time (if ever) and can also revert back to a previously abandoned model.  
                                                 
5 It is very well possible that with further data, another model will be identified. Therefore, we leave the post-
reform model label available for future research.  12 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Structural Breaks in the Baseline Model of Growth 
Index range:  Full sample  [Min; -0.7843)  [-0.7843, Max]  [-0.7843, 0.7191)  [0.7191; Max]   
Stability of model:   Unstable model  Stable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Stable model   
 (1)    (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Reform index  -2.632  (1.49)  -18.979** (2.24) -1.747 (0.90) -1.108 (0.44) -4.096 (1.35)
Reform index lagged  6.868*** (4.05)  51.767*** (5.80) 5.684*** (3.77) 4.578** (2.46) 5.070** (2.19)
Democracy   -9.823*** (4.03) 2.455 (0.45) -9.468*** (3.40) -17.168*** (4.18) -0.363 (0.13)
Inflation (log)  -1.529*** (5.80)  -1.911*** (3.66) -1.377*** (4.27) -1.617*** (3.73) 0.553 (1.31)
War Dummy  -9.615*** (6.45)  -9.970*** (4.52) -8.377*** (4.16) -9.605*** (4.11)    
Sec. school enrollment  -0.038  (0.63)  0.193 (1.53) -0.142** (2.24) -0.232** (2.55) -0.039 (0.72)
Population growth  0.394  (0.95)  1.779** (2.00) 0.598 (1.27) 0.353 (0.57) -0.057 (0.11)
EBRD IC1 measure  0.358  (1.37)  -0.032 (0.04) 0.264 (1.06) 0.831** (2.17) -0.350 (1.47)
Intercept 13.734*** (2.63)  26.618** (2.21) 21.948*** (3.98) 34.025*** (4.27) 6.174 (1.24)
R
2  0.5676   0.6313 0.5466 0.5643   0.1228   
F-stat / p-value  42.66  0.00  13.70 0.00 28.18 0.00 19.10  0.00 1.22 0.3059
N  269    73 196 127    69   
Break  located  at    -0.7843    -0.8862 0.7191 0.3552   1.4059   
Chow test stat
1  5.77  1.908 2.126 1.466   0.737  
Critical  value 1.88   2.07 1.88 1.98   2.02   
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
1 Chow test statistic for the presence of another structural break. Bold font indicates that the break is significant.  13 
Clearly, using a different regression specification could lead us to identify different structural 
breaks. Therefore, to test the robustness of our results, we repeated the analysis with four 
alternative regression specifications. Omitting the democracy index, the first structural break at -
0.7843 is reproduced but no further significant break points can be identified afterwards, 
suggesting that there may be only two stable models. Omitting school enrollment from the 
baseline model resulted in same breaks as in the baseline model (note however that the suspected 
break at index value –0.8862 is very close to being significant, see Table A2). The last structural 
break is identical to those obtained with the baseline model, occurring at index value of 0.7191. 
When omitting population growth or both population growth and school enrollment from the 
baseline model (see Tables A3 and A4, respectively), the first break occurs at a slightly lower 
value of the reform index, -0.8862. The test also identifies an additional break at -0.8862. The 
pre-reform model thus spans the shorter interval [-1.3440, -0.8862). This results in an additional 
‘model’, which, however, contains only ten observations (because of the low number of 
observations, no regression results are reported). This additional structural break may indicate a 
disproportionate amount of noise (e.g. measurement error) in some of those ten observations that 
makes them stand apart from either of the adjacent intervals.
6 The last structural break occurs 
again at 0.7191.  
Importantly, the regression results obtained with the four alternative regression models are 
very similar to the one obtained with the baseline model. Omitting the democracy index 
strengthens the significant of the reform index, which confirms that the two variables are 
correlated. Furthermore, in the regressions without population growth and without both 
population growth and school enrollment, the measure of initial conditions becomes significant 
and negative in the late reform stage, indicating that countries with adverse initial conditions tend 
to report a better growth performance (in contrast to the early reform stage when adverse initial 
conditions hinder growth). Given the similarity of the results, the discussion in the remainder of 
our paper centers on the baseline regression model reported in Table 3.  
Table 4 reports the average values of growth, inflation and the reform index for the three 
models. The pre-reform period is associated with serious economic malaise, countries in this 
stage on average decline by over 9% per year and experience price increases of hyperinflationary 
proportions, over 800% per year. Compared to that, the second model presents a marked 
                                                 
6 These twelve observations are Armenia 1994, Belarus 1998-2000, Bulgaria 1991, Hungary 1990, Lithuania 
1992, Romania 1992, Ukraine 1994, and Turkmenistan 1997-99.  14 
improvement: although growth remains negative, the decline slows down considerably to 2% per 
year and inflation falls to 200%. Finally, countries in the late reform category grow nearly 4% per 
year with inflation only at 13%.  
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics  
   MEANS  STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Model  Growth Inflation  Reform  index  Growth Inflation  Reform  index 
1 (Pre-reform)  -9.230667  842.8703 -1.163464 11.57453 2033.249 0.1951703
2 (Early reform)  -2.119847  226.8466 0.1019761 8.72021 418.2046 0.4529174
3 (Late reform)  3.734783  13.36667 1.250008 2.795313 10.54381 0.2884506
Notes: Models 1, 2 and 3 refer to the three stable models reported in Table 1 in columns (2), (4) and (5), respectively.  
 
 
A question of great interest, of course, is which countries belong to each model of growth at 
which time. In principle, a country in transition should proceed through all three stages, although 
the speed, or the time spend in each stage, may differ. Table 5 presents a tabular representation of 
the distribution of countries into the three models over time. Poland and the former Yugoslavia 
are found in the second, early transition model already as early as 1990. This does not imply that 
these countries never experienced central planning, rather, it reflects their progress in 
implementing partial reforms already in the course of the 1980s (and in case of the former 
Yugoslavia, even before that). Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia join this group in 1991, 
followed by the Baltic countries in 1992-93. The rest of CEE, European FSU countries (except 
those in the Caucasus), and Kyrgyzstan also progress to the early reform model in the first half of 
the 1990s. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia and the Baltics are 
again the first to reach the late-reform model of growth, to which they progress between 1993 and 
1996. In contrast, the other countries go much more slowly through each stage. The Southern 
European and European FSU countries reach the early reform stage in the first half of the 1990s, 
but then remain there until 2001 (the end of our data), except for Bulgaria, Macedonia and 
Romania, which move to the late reform stage in 1999-2000 and Russia, which finds itself in the 
third stage in 1997 but leaves it again the following year (apparently in connection with its 
financial crisis of 1998). The FSU countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia only graduate to 
the early reform model by mid decade and then stay there, except Kyrgyzstan, which makes the 
first leap already by 1993 and then briefly, and just barely, makes it to the late reform model in 
1997 and 1998. Finally, Turkmenistan and Belarus show rather disappointing performance, with 15 
the former never leaving the pre-reform model of growth and the latter reversing the early 
progress in reform so that it reverts from the early transition stage back to the pre-transition one 
in 1998 and stays there through 2000.  
Much of the discussion on the patterns of growth during transition centered on the role of 
liberal policies in delivering efficiency improvements that lead to higher growth. However, that 
discussion has so far been largely inconclusive: while some argue that progress in liberalization 
improves growth (see De Melo, Denizer and Gelb, 1996; Havrylyshyn, Izvorski and van Rooden, 
1998; or Berg et al., 1999), others suggest that initial conditions or the fact that progress in 
liberalization is endogenous in economic performance explain most of the differences in growth 
patterns (see Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; and Heybey and Murrell, 1999). Yet, essentially all of 
these studies were conducted using data pooled either across countries or time (or both). Hence, 
they fail to account for the changing nature of growth and therefore it is not at all surprising that 
they often arrive at very different findings.  
In contrast, the regression results reported in Table 4 are estimated with data that is free of 
structural breaks. Therefore, it is instructive to compare the impact of liberal policies, and other 
factors, on growth in the three stages of reform.
7 Liberalization in all three models has a negative 
contemporaneous effect on growth while its lagged effect is positive. The coefficient on the 
lagged term is always larger in absolute value than that for the contemporaneous term, indicating 
that the cumulative impact of liberalization on growth is positive. Moreover, the 
contemporaneous, negative effect is not significant in the second and third stages while the 
lagged positive one always is. Last but not least, the impact of liberalization is at its strongest in 
the pre-reform period when an increase in the reform index by 1 increases growth cumulatively 
by 33% over two years (a decrease of 19% in the first year followed by an increase of 52% in the 
second year).
8 The gains from liberalization are much more modest in the other two models, 3% 
in the early reform and 0.7% in the late reform stage. Thus, laying the institutional foundations of 
the market economy brings much greater benefits in terms of economic growth than the 
subsequent adjustment and fine-tuning of reforms.  
                                                 
7 Recall that the three stable models are reported in columns (2), (4) and (5).  
8 Recall that the reform index that we use ranges between –1.34 and 1.93.  16 
 
Table 5 Evolution of Growth Patterns across Countries and Time 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Albania  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Armenia  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Azerbaijan  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Belarus  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  2 
Bulgaria  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3 
Croatia  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Czech Rep.  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Estonia  1  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Georgia  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Hungary  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Kazakhstan  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Kyrgyzstan  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  3  3  2  2  2 
Latvia  1  1  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Lithuania  1  1  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Macedonia  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3 
Moldova  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Poland  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Romania  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3 
Russia  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  3  2  2  2  2 
Slovakia  1  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Slovenia  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
Tajikistan  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Turkmenistan  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Ukraine  1  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Uzbekistan  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
Notes: The Table shows which model of growth a country belongs to in any given year between 1990 and 2001.  
Models 1, 2 and 3 refer to the three stable models reported in Table 1 in columns (2), (4) and (5), respectively.  
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It is interesting to note also that democracy appears to have a negative effect on growth in the 
early reform stage. This may be due to increased political uncertainty associated with 
democratization (the reformist government can be voted out of office and replaced by one less 
inclined to continue the reform). Moreover, a government facing election may choose to pursue 
policies that maximize its political support in the short term but do not lead to efficiency 
improvements in the long run. However, Fidrmuc (2003) who finds a similar effect of democracy 
argues that this negative coefficient is due to the strong correlation between the reform and 
democracy indexes. When he controls for this relationship, he finds that democracy has a positive 
overall impact on growth.  
Inflation lowers growth in the pre-reform and early reform models of growth but not in the 
late reform model, possibly because inflation is generally low in this stage. This is consistent with 
the finding reported by Bruno and Easterly (1996) that only high inflation (above 40%) is 
detrimental to growth. Being involved in a military conflict, not surprisingly, has a strong adverse 
impact on growth (none of the countries in the late reform model of growth were affected by 
wars, therefore, the war dummy had to be omitted in the last regression).  
The result obtained for secondary school enrollment is surprising: it is insignificant in the pre-
reform and late reform stages but negative and significant in the early reform model, thus 
indicating that countries with higher better human capital in fact grow more slowly. However, a 
number of potential culprits can be listed to explain this counter-intuitive finding
9: school 
enrollment reported in late 1980s may be subject to measurement errors or misreporting, the 
figure may be no longer relevant in the mid and late 1990s as the stock of human capital has been 
altered in the meantime by migration and new developments in schooling, and education acquired 
in communist education system may not be easily transferable to a market environment.  
Population growth seems to encourage economic growth in the pre-reform stage. This may be 
due to prevalent dependence on the extensive pattern of growth under central planning (i.e. faster 
population growth translates into greater input of labor). Moreover, the positive coefficient may 
also reflect the fact that the break-up of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought about 
sizeable migratory movements of people in prime age.  
                                                 
9 Such counter-intuitive findings are, however, not entirely unusual in the transition growth literature. Campos, 
2001, for example, finds that in some regression specifications, investment appears to have a negative impact on 
growth while in others government expenditure seems to encourage growth – both findings being in stark contrast to 
the patterns found for developed countries.  18 
The EBRD indicator of initial conditions is only significant in the early-reform stage when 
countries with a greater extent of macroeconomic imbalance grew less dynamically (or, as was 
often the case, declined more rapidly). The lack of a significant impact of initial conditions on 
growth in the first model is surprising, considering the attention that this relationship has received 
in the literature (see Aslund et al., 1996; Krueger and Ciolko, 1998; and Heybey and Murrell, 
1999). For the late reform stage, our finding of no effect parallels those of Berg et al. (1998) and 
Falcetti et al. (2002). We further explored the potential role of initial conditions by testing for 
presence of structural breaks in growth according to the different values of the initial conditions 
measure. However, we found no structural breaks in this manner. Hence, while progress in 
implementing economic reforms is related to the occurrence of structural breaks, the patterns of 
growth during transition do not appear to differ across countries with different initial conditions.  
Finally, the last, late-reform model has rather low overall explanatory power (the F-statistic 
indicates in fact that the regression as a whole is not significant) and only the lagged reform index 
turns out with a significant coefficient. This may be because of the relatively low number of 
observations, or it is an indication that the pattern of growth during that stage is still undergoing 
further changes. More data will be needed to a get better estimate of the model of growth during 
the third stage.  
 
4  Conclusion 
In this paper, we use the heterogeneous growth experiences of post-communist countries to 
demonstrate the changing nature of fundamental economic relationships during transition. As the 
various elements of the market environment are implemented, one can see, indeed one should 
expect to see, important changes concerning the way the transition economies work. Facilitating 
such changes, after all, is the very objective of the reform.  
Presence of structural breaks, however, implies that empirical analyses of transition must 
account for the changing nature of the relationships studied, otherwise the findings will be 
misleading. In our analysis of the relationship between reform-oriented policies and growth, we 
found evidence of two structural breaks. Moreover, individual countries may experience the 
breaks at different points in time. In our data covering 25 countries and 12 years, for example, 
almost half of the countries have not yet experienced the second structural break and one has not 
even experienced the first one.  19 
While we demonstrate the fragility of econometric results using a specific relationship that 
has aroused much interest in the transition literature, our argument is likely to be valid more 
generally. Therefore, this paper constitutes a cautionary tale for any empirical analyst studying 
multiple countries and/or longer time periods during transition: structural breaks are likely during 
transition, and may occur in time and in space alike.  
Our analysis also sheds new light on the much-disputed relationship between reform-minded 
policies and growth during transition. For our base model, we find evidence of two breaks and 
thus three different models of growth, which we refer to as pre-reform, early reform and late 
reform pattern of growth. Individual countries go through the three stages of growth at 
dramatically different speed: while some progress to the late reform model three or four years 
after the beginning of transition, others take much longer or remain in the early reform model 
until the end of our period. The growth determinants are significantly different between the 
models. Therefore, the presence of structural break may account for the differences in findings 
reported by previous studies, which typically differed from each other concerning the number of 
countries and even more periods covered by their analyses. The impact of reform-minded policies 
indeed weakens as countries move closer to becoming market economies, hence one is more 
likely to find a significant relationship using data from the early part of transition than with a 
longer data set.  
We find that contemporaneous liberalization has a significantly negative effect on growth 
only in the pre-reform period. The lagged effect, in contrast, is positive and significant in all of 
the three models. The cumulative effect of liberalization (the sum of the contemporaneous and 
lagged effects) is largest in the pre-reform stage. Rather surprisingly, we find that democracy 
hurts growth performance, although only in the second, early-reform stage of growth. This may 
indicate that the political and policy uncertainty associated with political liberalization had 
adverse economic repercussions during the early reform stage. Finally, in contrast to previous 
literature, we find that initial conditions do not have an overwhelming effect on growth. Even 
more importantly, we were unable to identify any structural breaks in the pattern of growth based 
on cross-country differences in initial conditions. In summary, we show that the pattern of growth 
changes in relation to progress in implementing market-oriented reforms. Nevertheless, we did 
not consider the issue of endogeneity of progress in reform, which has been raised in a number of 
recent studies. This question still remains open for further research. 
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Annex 1: Percentage of common variation between EBRD indicators 
  Price Lib  Forex/Trade Lib  Small Scale Priv Large Scale Priv Ent. Reform  Comp.Policy  Bank Reform 
  Min Max  Min Max  Min Max  Min Max  Min Max  Min Max  Min Max 
P r i c e   L i b                 
Forex/Trade 
Liberalization 
3.61 
(1996) 
84.6 
( 1 9 9 1 )               
Small Scale 
Privatization 
3.46 
(1995) 
82.8 
(1990) 
43.6 
(1990) 
72.25 
( 1 9 9 5 )             
Large Scale 
Privatization 
3.1 
(1997) 
42 
(2001) 
16.8 
(1991) 
65.6 
(1990) 
0.81 
(1991) 
65.6 
(2001)          
Enterprise 
Reform 
8.3 
(1997) 
42.2 
(2000) 
29.2 
(1992) 
72.25 
(1994) 
17.6 
(1992) 
74 
(2000) 
20.25 
(1996) 
67.2 
(2001)        
Competition 
Policy 
0.04 
(1993) 
30.2 
(1991) 
7.8 
(1995) 
39 
(1991) 
4.84 
(1995) 
45 
(2000) 
1 
(1996) 
49 
(1994) 
30.25 
(1995) 
100 
(1990)      
Banking Reform 
11.56 
(1996) 
50.4 
(1998) 
31.4 
(1990) 
77.4 
(1994) 
22 
(1990) 
70.6 
(1997) 
21.6 
(1992) 
67.2 
(1998) 
56.25 
(1995) 
100 
(1990) 
8.41 
(1995) 
100 
(1990)    
Non-bank. 
Financial Inst. 
0.09 
(1996) 
25 
(1991) 
0.64 
(1992) 
36 
(1994) 
1.21 
(1992) 
34.8 
(2000) 
0.01 
(1992) 
47.6 
(1991) 
0.36 
(1990) 
67.2 
(2001) 
0.36 
(1990) 
64 
(2001) 
0.36 
(1990) 
65.6 
(1999) 
 
Note: year when minimum and maximum occurs in parenthesis 
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Annex 2 : Evolution of the aggregate index by country and by year 
i
n
d
e
x
 
Year
Albania
-1.34408
1.93259
Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Bulgaria
Croatia
-1.34408
1.93259
Czech Rep. Estonia Georgia Hungary
Kazakhstan
-1.34408
1.93259
Kyrgyzstan Latvia Lithuania Macedonia
Moldova
-1.34408
1.93259
Poland Romania Russia Slovakia
Slovenia
1989 2001
-1.34408
1.93259
Tajikistan
1989 2001
Turkmenistan
1989 2001
Ukraine
1989 2001
Uzbekistan
1989 2001
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Annex 3: Robustness Checks: Alternative Regression Models 
 
Table A1 Structural Breaks in a Model without Democracy  
Index range:  Full sample  [Min; -0.7843)  [-0.7843, Max]     
Stability of model:   Unstable model  Stable model  Stable model     
 (1)  (2) (4)  
Reform index  -3.980** (1.780) -18.801** (8.409) -4.575*** (1.807)  
Reform index lagged  7.331*** (1.743) 50.618*** (8.501) 6.398*** (1.536)  
Inflation (log)  -1.510*** (0.271) -1.901*** (0.519) -1.581*** (0.326)  
War Dummy  -9.679*** (1.533) -9.897*** (2.186) -8.108*** (2.069)    
Sec. school enrollment  -0.048 (0.061) 0.202 (0.124) -0.113*** (0.065)  
Population growth  0.759* (0.416) 1.706 (0.868) 1.086 (0.460)  
EBRD IC1 measure  -0.214 (0.227) 0.130** (0.671) -0.194 (0.216)  
Intercept  9.135* (5.242) 25.791** (11.851) 15.722*** (5.340)  
R
2  0.541   0.630  0.519      
F-stat / p-value  43.87  0.00 15.82 0.00 28.92 0.00  
N  269   73  196      
Potential break located at   -0.7843   -0.8862  0.3960      
Chow test stat
1  7.43  1.96 1.66       
Critical value  1.94   2.13  1.98      
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
1 Chow test statistic maximum for the presence of another structural break. Bold font indicates that the break is significant.  
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Table A2 Structural Breaks in a Model without School Enrollment 
Index range:  Full sample  [Min; -0.7843)  [-0.7843, Max]  [-0.7843, 0.7191)  [0.7191; Max] 
Stability of model:   Unstable model  Stable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Stable model 
 (1)  (2) (4) (5)  (6)
Reform index  -2.686  (1.758) -21.574** (8.383) -2.642 (1.924) -2.308 (2.515) -4.355 (3.007)
Reform index lagged  6.878*** (1.696) 52.654*** (9.004) 5.859*** (1.523) 5.144*** (1.893) 5.036** (2.310)
Democracy   -9.891*** (2.431) 3.863 (5.473) -8.612*** (2.785)-15.483*** (4.149) -0.044 (2.763)
Inflation (log)  -1.532*** (0.263) -1.824*** (0.525) -1.511*** (0.321) -1.773*** (0.440) 0.514 (0.416)
War Dummy  -9.531*** (1.483) -10.199*** (2.223) -7.903*** (2.025) -8.703*** (2.364)   
Population growth  0.437  (0.408) 1.340 (0.849) 0.629 (0.475) 0.427  (0.637) -0.059 (0.498)
EBRD IC1 measure  0.387  (0.258) -0.109 (0.773) 0.356 (0.249) 0.969** (0.389) -0.308 (0.230)
Intercept 10.630*** (1.690) 39.890*** (8.456) 10.226*** (1.757) 14.585*** (2.409) 2.968 (2.191)
R
2  0.567   0.618  0.534  0.540   0.115 
F-stat / p-value  48.82  0.00 15.02 0.00 30.82 0.00 19.97  0.00 1.35 0.25
N  269   73  196  127   69 
Potential break located at   -0.7843   -0.8862  0.7191  0.378   1.38 
Chow test stat
1  5.74  2.03 2.05 1.74   0.95 
Critical value  1.94   2.13  1.98  2.03   2.13 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
1 Chow test statistic maximum for the presence of another structural break. Bold font indicates that the break is significant.  
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Table A3 Structural Breaks in a Model without Population Growth 
Index range:  Full sample  [Min; -0.8002)  [Min; -0.8862)  [-0.8002, Max]  [-0. 8002, 0.7191)  [0.7191; Max] 
Stability of model:   Unstable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Stable model 
 (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform index  -2.643  (1.698) -24.562*** (8.670)-29.722*** (10.681) -2.343 (1.858) -1.362 (2.347) -3.418 (2.694)
Reform index lagged  6.797*** (1.631)  52.020*** (9.316) 57.077*** (11.535) 5.880*** (1.460) 4.721*** (1.797) 4.142* (2.154)
Democracy   -10.535*** (2.226)  -0.204 (5.617) -0.523 (5.680) -10.170*** (2.459) -18.471*** (3.672) 1.946 (2.624)
Inflation (log)  -1.605*** (0.251)  -1.806*** (0.523) -1.764*** (0.555) -1.524*** (0.302) -1.762*** (0.401) 0.429 (0.375)
War Dummy  -9.587*** (1.438)  -10.098*** (2.268)-11.696*** (2.172) -8.030*** (1.921) -9.425*** (2.190)  
Sec. school enrollment  -0.053  (0.055)  0.123 (0.128) 0.160 (0.133) -0.117** (0.058) -0.216* (0.083) -0.019 (0.049)
EBRD IC1 measure  0.218  (0.245)  -0.726 (0.742) -1.197* (0.731) 0.160 (0.232) 0.792** (0.360) -0.457** (0.215)
Intercept 15.837*** (4.718)  27.134** (12.480) 23.799 (16.097) 21.158*** (5.017) 34.278*** (7.298) 3.192 (4.436)
R
2  0.577   0.619 0.658 0.544 0.591 0.122 
F-stat / p-value  55.73  0.00  14.82 0.00 14.81 0.00 36.42 0.00 27.48 0.00 1.72 0.13
N 294    72  62  222  141  81 
Potential break located 
at   -0.8002    -0.8862   0.7191 0.3694  1.444 
Chow test stat
1  6.44   2.22 1.56 3.31 1.61 0.93 
Critical  value 1.94   2.13 2.13 1.98 2.03 2.03 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). No regression results are reported for reform index values over 
[ -0.8862, -0.8002) because this interval contains too few observations.  
1 Chow test statistic maximum for the presence of another structural break. Bold font indicates that the break is significant.  
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Table A4 Structural Breaks in a Model of Growth without School Enrollment and Population Growth 
Index range:  Full sample  [Min; -0.8002)  [Min; -0.8862)  [-0.8002, Max]  [-0. 8002, 0.7191)  [0.7191; Max] 
Stability of model:   Unstable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Unstable model  Stable model  Stable model 
 (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reform index  -2.769* (1.693)  -25.390*** (8.621)-28.107*** (10.640) -3.123* (1.831) -2.570 (2.349) -3.598 (2.640)
Reform index lagged  6.850*** (1.630) 52.275*** (9.307) 54.631*** (11.402) 6.048*** (1.468) 5.267*** (1.822) 4.162* (2.141)
Democracy   -10.695*** (2.220)  1.324 (5.384) 1.651 (5.409) -9.394*** (2.447) -16.549*** (3.673) 2.095 (2.582)
Inflation (log)  -1.615*** (0.251) -1.765*** (0.521) -1.783*** (0.557) -1.642*** (0.299) -1.929*** (0.404) 0.410 (0.369)
War Dummy  -9.436*** (1.429)  -10.221*** (2.263)-11.903*** (2.174) -7.617*** (1.923) -8.477*** (2.205)  
EBRD IC1 measure  0.254  (0.242)  -0.673 (0.739) -1.178 (0.734) 0.235 (0.230) 0.893** (0.366) -0.434** (0.205)
Intercept 11.550*** (1.504) 35.937*** (8.458) 35.151*** (13.109) 11.484*** (1.519) 16.049*** (2.025) 1.622 (2.003)
R
2  0.576    0.613 0.648 0.535 0.571 0.120 
F-stat / p-value  64.89  0.00 17.16 0.00 16.90 0.00 41.21 0.00 29.67 0.00 2.05 0.08
N 294    72  62  222  141  81 
Potential  break  located  at    -0.8002    -0.8862  -0.968 0.7191 0.3785 1.4430 
Chow test stat
1  7.00   2.54 2.09 3.28 1.87 1.17 
Critical  value  1.94    2.13 2.13 1.98 2.03 2.03 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated as 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). No regression results are reported for reform index values over 
[ -0.8862, -0.8002) because this interval contains too few observations.  
1 Chow test statistic maximum for the presence of another structural break. Bold font indicates that the break is significant.  
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